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Fault refers to the defendant's conduct whereas "contributory fault" (whether in the 
form of intention or negligence) refers to the conduct of the plaintiff.1 Contributory 
intent (a form of contributory fault)2 can take different forms,3 but as long as it can 
be established that the plaintiff acted with intent, contributory intent is present and 
may result in the limitation of the defendant's liability in terms of the Apportionment 
of Damages Act4 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act").5 The Act provides that the 
defendant's relative fault is taken into account resulting in the plaintiff receiving a 
reduction in the award of his or her damage. In practice, different scenarios are 
possible whereby either the plaintiff or the defendant is at fault in the form of 
intention or negligence.6 The Act is applicable only to damage caused partly by the 
fault of the plaintiff and partly by the fault of the defendant. Therefore the Act is not 
applicable where the defendant is not at fault.7 The Act is also applicable to cases 
based on vicarious liability.8 Even though fault relates to negligence and intention, 
∗ Raheel Ahmed. LLB, LLM (UNISA). Admitted Attorney, Conveyancer and Notary of the High Court 
of South Africa. Senior Lecturer, Department of Private Law, University of South Africa. Email: 
ahmedr@unisa.ac.za.  
 This contribution is based on part of an LLM dissertation completed by the author in 2011 at the 
University of South Africa under the guidance and supervision of Prof J Neethling. This 
contribution was written on the advice of one of the examiners of the dissertation, who hoped 
that it would bring a renewed interest in the forgotten Apportionment of Loss Bill 2003. 
1  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 161; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 147; Ahmed 
2014 SALJ 88. 
2  Contributory intent is not the same as but is analogous to intent. It is legally impossible for a 
person to have intent in respect of him- or herself, thus the term "contributory intent" is merely 
used to establish the fault of the plaintiff. See Ahmed 2012 Obiter 419; Ahmed 2014 SALJ 89. 
3  Direct, indirect and dolus eventualis – see in general Loubser et al Delict 109-112; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 127; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 157-158. 
4  Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
5  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 161. 
6  These possible scenarios will be discussed further in para 2.1.3 below. 
7  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 163-164. 
8  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 240. 
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our courts9 have applied the Act mainly to contributory negligence. Nevertheless, the 
law has evolved and the Act has been applied to practical situations that have arisen 
in modern times. Our courts have had to deal with contributory intent and intent on 
the part of the defendant within the context of apportionment of liability and have 
been trying to find an equitable result in such circumstances where the legislature 
does not specifically provide for conduct performed intentionally.10 A Bill11 has been 
prepared to replace the current Act, but has not yet been promulgated. In terms of 
the Bill the defence of "contributory intent" as a defence limiting liability will be 
applicable. 
In this contribution it is illustrated that there is a pressing need for the defence of 
"contributory intent" limiting liability to be recognised and developed in our law. To 
begin with, a discussion of the function of "contributory intent" as a defence limiting 
delictual liability within the ambit of the Act is necessary. A brief discussion of 
proposed future legislation is provided, as well as an exposition of relevant foreign 
law. Recommendations are also provided on how to develop and incorporate this 
defence (which limits delictual liability) in our law. 
2  The application of the defence of "contributory intent" within the 
ambit of the Act 
Historically, contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff was applied in our 
law as a complete defence, and followed firstly the harsh Roman and Roman-Dutch 
"all or nothing rule"12 and thereafter the English "last opportunity rule" (even though 
there was clear Roman-Dutch law authority for an approach based on relative 
9  As well as those of other countries with similar legislation apportioning liability as discussed in 
para 4 below. 
10  See Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 
1997 2 SA 591 (W). 
11  Apportionment of Loss Bill 2003.  
12  The plaintiff was precluded from claiming any damages from the defendant, even though the 
defendant was also to blame in respect of causing the damage. See Loubser et al Delict 436-
437; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 161; Burchell Delict 107; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles 
of Delict 239. 
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degrees of fault of the plaintiff and the defendant).13 In terms of the "last 
opportunity" rule, whichever party had the last opportunity (a test for causation)14 of 
avoiding the accident by acting with reasonable care, that party would be solely 
responsible for the damage or loss caused.15 Thus the negligence of one of the 
parties was considered as the "decisive cause" of the accident.16 As pointed out by 
Boberg,17 the last opportunity rule had several weaknesses.18 The English legislature 
later replaced this rule with a more equitable principle of proportional division of 
damages based on each party's degree of fault in terms of the "Contributory 
Negligence Act".19 Since the "last opportunity rule" proved untenable in South Africa 
also, our legislature followed suit and enacted the Apportionment of Damages Act20 
(the "Act"), which changed the common law considerably.21 The Act is somewhat 
similar to the English "Contributory Negligence Act" and provides for a more fair and 
equitable approach of apportionment of damages in accordance with the respective 
degrees of fault of the parties in relation to the damage.22 
Contributory fault in South Africa is still regulated by the Act.23 The purpose of the 
Act is to ensure that a plaintiff's claim is not extinguished by the fact that he or she 
was partly to blame for the loss.24 "Apportioning of damages" in the Act does not 
13  See Burchell Delict 107; SALRC Project 96 5 para 1.15. As will be shown, this has inevitably led 
to the reluctance of our courts in acknowledging the defence of contributory intent in the present 
context. See para 4 below. 
14  Boberg Delict 657. 
15  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 239; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 161-162. 
16  If the defendant had the last opportunity, he or she had to compensate the negligent plaintiff to 
the full extent in respect of the plaintiff's loss, and if the plaintiff had the last opportunity, such 
plaintiff failed to recover any damages. See Pierce v Hau Mon 1944 AD 175; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Principles of Delict 239; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 161. 
17  Boberg Delict 653-654. 
18  It was a test for causation not based upon comparative culpability and was almost impossible to 
apply to modern-day motor collisions. It was then realised that the party who had the last 
opportunity was generally the more careful party of the two. The rule thereafter acquired an 
"objective gloss" as the question became "ought the plaintiff to have had a later opportunity of 
avoiding the accident than the defendant ought to have had?" However, if both parties behaved 
as they ought to have done, then, as Boberg (Delict 653-654) concluded, there would have been 
no accident! 
19  Contributory Negligence Act 1945. See Kotze 1956 THRHR 186. 
20  Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
21  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 161. 
22  SALRC Project 96 2. 
23  Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
24  See Minister van Wet en Orde v Ntsane 1993 1 SA 560 (A) 570; Van der Walt and Midgley 
Principles of Delict 240 n 12. 
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entail an actual division of damages between the plaintiff and the defendant, but is 
concerned with the process of reduction of damages received by the plaintiff as a 
result of the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.25 Section 1 of the Act deals with 
the reduction of the award of damages due to the plaintiff's contributory fault, and 
section 2 deals with the sharing of liability between joint wrongdoers in respect of 
loss suffered by the plaintiff.26 These sections are of relevance with regard to the 
application of the defence of "contributory intent" and therefore require a more 
detailed discussion.  
2.1  Section 1 of the Act 
The Act does not specifically give a definition of fault, but section 1(3) provides that 
"[f]or the purposes of this section 'fault' includes any act or omission which would, 
but for the provisions of this section, have given rise to the defence of contributory 
negligence". The provisions contained in this subsection are "obscure"27 and the Act 
erroneously construes fault as an act or omission. It is trite law that fault relates to 
the legal blameworthiness of a person for his wrongful conduct. Therefore it is 
incorrect to consider fault as a type of conduct and to consider conduct alone. Other 
factors must be considered in determining fault.28 
The Act refers to contributory negligence in the long title and the heading of section 
1 of the Act, whereas the text of section 1 of the Act refers to the "fault" of the 
plaintiff and the defendant29 (fault in general relates to intention and negligence).30 
Section 1(1)(a) provides: 
Where any person suffers damage which is caused partly by his own fault and 
partly by the fault of any other person, a claim in respect of that damage shall not 
be defeated by reason of the fault of the claimant but the damages recoverable in 
respect thereof shall be reduced by the court to such extent as the court may deem 
25  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 162-163; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 240. 
26 Loubser et al Delict 436. 
27  See Kotze 1956 THRHR 191, who also submits that the stipulation is strange and makes no 
sense.  
28  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 168; Scott 1997 De Jure 392. 
29  See also s 2(14) of the Act; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 240 n 9; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 162; Loubser et al Delict 436. 
30 Neethling and Potgieter Delict 162; Burchell Delict 110; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of 
Delict  240. 
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just and equitable having regard to the degree in which the claimant was at fault in 
relation to the damage. 
Section 1(1)(b) provides that "[d]amage shall for the purpose of paragraph (a) be 
regarded as having been caused by a person's fault notwithstanding the fact that 
another person had an opportunity of avoiding the consequences thereof and 
negligently failed to do so". It is evident that these sections were enacted with the 
clear intention of abolishing the "last opportunity rule" and are expressly confined to 
damage caused partly by the plaintiff's "own fault". This caused confusion and 
uncertainty as to whether it applied only to negligence or to both the forms of fault 
(negligence and intention).31 
2.1.1  Arguments supporting the view that fault in terms of section 1 of the Act 
excludes intent 
In light of statutory interpretation it has been argued that the explicit reference to 
contributory negligence in the long title of the Act and the heading in section 1, as 
well as the use of a similar concept of fault with reference to both plaintiff and 
defendant in section 1, indicate that "fault" bears a restricted meaning of either 
contributory negligence (on the part of the plaintiff) or negligence (on the part of 
the defendant).32 Chapter 1 of the Act is headed "CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE". 
Section 1 is headed "Apportionment of liability in case of contributory negligence".33 
Also with regard to the historical background leading to the enactment of the Act it 
seems that the legislature intended to make provision for the defence of contributory 
negligence34 and not "contributory intent".35 
31  Pretorius Medewerkende Opset 220 et seq refers to views that varied considerably.  
32  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 244 n 9 refer to South British Insurance Co Ltd v 
Smit 1962 3 SA 826 (A) 835-836. 
33  See Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 
1996 4 All SA 278 (W) 290-291. 
34  Mabaso v Felix 1981 3 SA 865 (A); South British Insurance Co Ltd v Smit 1962 3 SA 826 (A) 835; 
King v Pearl Insurance Co Ltd 1970 1 SA 462 (W) 467; Kelly 2001 SA Merc LJ 514 n 223. 
35  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 163; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 211; Boberg 
Delict 656; Kelly 2001 SA Merc LJ 514-517.  
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Kelly36 refers to a number of cases which support this view. In South British 
Insurance Co Ltd v Smit37 the court held that "fault" means negligence and "degree 
of fault" means degree of negligence.38 The Appellate Division stated obiter in 
Mabaso v Felix39 that it was extremely doubtful whether section 1(1)(a) was 
applicable where the fault of a defendant was in the form of an intentional 
wrongdoing.40 The court also considered the definition of fault in section 1(3) and 
expressed its doubt whether fault included intentional wrongdoing. In Netherlands 
Insurance Co of SA Ltd v Van der Vyver41 the Appellate Division did not find it 
necessary to decide upon the issue. But in Thoroughbred Breeders' Association of 
South Africa v Price Waterhouse42 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that "fault" 
must obviously be confined to negligence. Also in King v Pearl Insurance Co Ltd43 
the court held that fault as used in section 1 refers exclusively to contributory 
negligence.44 
2.1.2  Arguments supporting the view that fault in terms of section 1 of the Act 
includes intent 
In contradistinction to the views expressed above, it has been argued that a wider 
interpretation of fault should be made so as to include intent in terms of section 1 of 
the Act. According to this approach it is first of all trite law that "fault" generally 
includes both intention and negligence. Secondly, "fault" does not have a restricted 
meaning in the context of section 2 of the Act.45 Thirdly, in Greater Johannesburg 
Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd46 Goldstone J47 rejected the 
36  See Kelly 2001 SA Merc LJ 514-517.  
37  South British Insurance Co Ltd v Smit 1962 3 SA 826 (A) 835. 
38  SALRC Project 96 13; cf Du Bois et al Wille's Principles of South African Law 1148. 
39  Mabaso v Felix 1981 3 SA 865 (A) 877. 
40  Du Bois et al Wille's Principles of South African Law 1148. 
41  Netherlands Insurance Co of SA Ltd v Van der Vyver 1968 1 SA 412 (A) 422. 
42  Thoroughbred Breeders' Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA) 600. 
43 King v Pearl Insurance Co Ltd 1970 1 SA 462 (W); see also Du Bois et al Wille's Principles of 
South African Law 1148. 
44  SALRC Project 96 13. See also the views of Potgieter 1998 THRHR 731-735; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 211; Boberg Delict 657, 743.  
45  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 244-245 n 10; Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v 
FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W). 
46  Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1996 
4 All SA 278 (W) 290. 
47  Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1996 
4 All SA 278 (W) 292; 1997 2 SA 591 (W) 607. 
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argument that the heading to section 1 indicates that the legislature intended only a 
restricted meaning for the term "fault". He quoted the dictum of Innes CJ in 
Turffontein Estates Ltd v Mining Commissioner, Johannesburg48 in which the court 
laid down the rule that the heading of a section could be invoked as an aid to 
construction only when the intention of the lawgiver as expressed in any clause is 
unclear. Goldstein J49 further submitted that the wording of section 1(1)(a) is quite 
clear and unambiguous, thus preventing  recourse to the heading of section 1.50 
Fourthly, Kelly51 refers to the suggestion that the problems relating to intention with 
regard to section 1(1)(a) should be treated as they were in S v Ngubane,52 where it 
was held that if a person acts intentionally, he simultaneously also acts negligently. 
This view should be thoroughly scrutinised. Van der Merwe and Olivier's53 view is 
that intention and negligence are mutually exclusive concepts in the sense that one 
cannot be present when the other exists; but there are a number of judgments 
which support the view that if intent is present, negligence is simultaneously 
present.54 In S v Ngubane55 the Appellate Division held that for the purposes of 
criminal law (relevant to the law of delict) intent and negligence may be present 
simultaneously. Mahomed J in Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern 
Region) (Pty) Ltd56 also expressed the view that intention and negligence are not 
48  Turffontein Estates Ltd v Mining Commissioner, Johannesburg 1917 AD 419 431. 
49  Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1997 
2 SA 591 (W) 607. 
50  See SALRC Project 96 20. 
51  Kelly 2001 SA Merc LJ 515; see also Neethling and Potgieter Delict 133-134; cf Van der Walt and 
Midgley Principles of Delict 245; Ahmed 2010 THRHR 703. 
52  S v Ngubane 1985 3 SA 677 (A). 
53  Referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 133. This view is according to Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 133 n 66 supported by the following cases: S v Sigwahla 1967 4 SA 566 (A); S v 
Naidoo 1974 4 SA 574 (N); S v Alexander 1982 4 SA 701 (T); AA Mutual Insurance Association 
Ltd v Manjani 1982 1 SA 790 (A) 796; Kgaleng v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 854 
(W) 874. 
54  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 133 n 67 refer to S v September 1972 3 SA 389 (C); S v Smith 
1981 4 SA 140 (C); S v Zoko 1983 1 SA 871 (N); cf Du Bois et al Wille's Principles of South 
African Law 1149; Ahmed 2010 THRHR 703. 
55  S v Ngubane 1985 3 SA 677 (A). 
56  Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W) 621.  
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mutually exclusive concepts. It is logically possible for both to be present 
simultaneously.57 
The view that if intent is present, negligence is simultaneously present is accepted 
by Burchell,58 Boberg59 and Neethling and Potgieter.60 It may be argued that the 
intentional causing of harm to another person is contrary to the standard of care 
which the reasonable person would have exercised and that negligence is thus 
simultaneously present.61 If Neethling's suggestion is accepted, that intent 
simultaneously constitutes negligence and that an intentional act (which may differ 
depending on the form of intent involved) deviates 100 per cent from the norm of 
the reasonable person, apportionment can be applied to cases involving 
"contributory intent" within the ambit of the Act.62 Similarly, apportionment can be 
applied between joint wrongdoers using the same yardstick.63 
Kotze64 is of the view that fault should be interpreted in a wider sense and that the 
Act should be applied in instances where both parties acted with intent. He65 further 
states that the premise of the entire Act rests on considerations of fairness and 
justice. This also appears to be the attitude in General Accident 
Versekeringsmaatskappy SA Bpk v Uijs,66 where Van Heerden JA was in favour of 
57  The interrelationship between dolus and culpa was aptly described by Thirion J in S v Zoko 1983 
1 SA 871 (N) 896: "The division between culpa and dolus in the lex Aquilia is not one into 
mutually exclusive concepts. If one accepts with Mucius (D9.2.31) that 'culpam autem esse quod 
cum diligente provideri poterit, non esset provisum' then culpa is the blame attaching to the 
wrongdoer for not having taken the precautions which he could reasonably have taken in the 
circumstances to prevent harm from resulting from his conduct. That blameworthiness remains, 
despite the fact that he actually foresaw the possibility of the resultant harm (which he ought 
reasonably to have foreseen and guarded against) and intentionally brought it about. All that 
happens in the case where dolus is present is that an additional element, namely that of dolus, is 
added. I think therefore that it is correct to say that culpa underlies the whole field of liability 
under the lex Aquilia, and that in this part of the law dolus is merely a species or a particular 
form of the blameworthiness which constitutes culpa."; SALRC Project 96 27. 
58  Burchell Delict 91, 110-111. 
59  Boberg Delict 273-274. 
60  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 133-134; cf Du Bois et al Wille's Principles of South African Law 
1148-1149. 
61  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 133.  
62  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 163 fn 233. 
63  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 266 fn 6; Neethling 1985 THRHR 250; Neethling and Potgieter 
1992 THRHR 660-661; cf Scott 1997 De Jure 393; Ahmed 2010 THRHR 703.  
64  Kotze 1956 THRHR 149.  
65  Kotze 1956 THRHR 187. 
66  General Accident Versekeringsmaatskappy SA Bpk v Uijs 1993 4 SA 228 (A). 
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applying not only fault but also other factors in apportioning liability between the 
parties. The approach of Van Heerden JA may be justified in light of the principles of 
fairness and equality. In order to really achieve fairness and equality, a holistic 
approach must be applied and other relevant factors should be considered besides 
the extent of the plaintiff's fault.67 
2.1.3  Questions raised with regard to section 1 of the Act 
2.1.3.1  Could a defendant who has intentionally caused damage to the plaintiff raise 
a plea of contributory negligence?68 
In terms of common law,69 Wapnick v Durban City Garage70 and Minister van Wet en 
Orde v Ntsane71 such a plea could not be sustained. It seems that the Act did not 
change this principle and that the Act is therefore not applicable to this situation.72 
Booysen J73 in Wapnick v Durban City Garage held that a "[d]efendant who has 
wrongfully and intentionally caused the [p]laintiff to suffer damages is not entitled to 
plead contributory negligence". In Minister van Wet en Orde v Ntsane, the Appellate 
Division found that the Defendant's employee intentionally harmed the plaintiff and 
that the Defendant could not rely on the defence of contributory negligence. The 
Appellate Division left open the question as to the meaning of fault in section 1(1)(a) 
of the Act but assumed that "fault" includes both negligence and intention.74 Be that 
as it may, as said, there is clear authority in our common law75 (in addition to 
67  See the criticism of Scott 1995 TSAR 132, who submits that the introduction of reasonableness 
and fairness as a criterion for apportioning damages in terms of s 1 of the Act may result in 
there being no fixed guidelines in particular circumstances (Neethling and Potgieter Delict 166 n 
251). 
68  See Minister van Wet en Orde v Ntsane 1993 1 SA 560 (A); Burchell Delict 110; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 162; Boberg Delict 656. 
69  Pierce v Hau Mon 1944 AD 175 198; Minister van Wet en Orde v Ntsane 1993 1 SA 560 (A) 570; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 162 n 228-229; cf Kotze 1956 THRHR 149. 
70  Wapnick v Durban City Garage 1984 2 SA 414 (D). 
71  Minister van Wet en Orde v Ntsane 1993 1 SA 560 (A). 
72  See Wapnick v Durban City Garage 1984 2 SA 414 (D) 418; McKerron Delict 297; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 163; Scott Huldingsbundel Paul van Warmelo 176; Du Bois et al Willes Principles 
of South African Law 1148. 
73  Wapnick v Durban City Garage 1984 2 SA 414 (D) 418. 
74  Minister van Wet en Orde v Ntsane 1993 1 SA 560 (A) 569. See Kelly 2001 SA Merc LJ 516. 
75  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 241 n 16 refer to D 9 2 9 4; Mabaso v Felix 1981 3 
SA 865 (A) 877; Wapnick v Durban City Garage 1984 2 SA 414 (D) 418; Minister van Wet en 
Orde v Ntsane 1993 1 SA 560 (A) 570; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 162 fn 228 also refer to 
Pierce v Hau Mon 1944 AD 175 198; cf Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v 
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Minister van Wet en Orde v Ntsane) which confirms that where the defendant has 
been guilty of dolus, the defence of contributory negligence cannot be raised against 
the plaintiff. Botha76 suggests that the courts should determine to what extent the 
intentional conduct of the defendant made "probable" the harmful consequences, 
and likewise to what extent the plaintiff's conduct made "probable" the harmful 
consequences. According to him the intentional conduct of the defendant will in 
most cases make the harmful consequences so probable that it is certain that he or 
she would be liable. It is therefore submitted that Minister van Wet en Orde v 
Ntsane was correctly decided, namely that where the defendant's fault is in the form 
of intent and the plaintiff's fault is in the form of negligence, the defendant cannot 
rely on the plaintiff's contributory negligence to reduce his or her liability. This 
should remain the de lege lata approach.  
2.1.3.2  Could a plaintiff who has intentionally contributed to his or her own loss 
succeed with a claim against a defendant who acted negligently?77 
In such instances the plaintiff will have to forfeit his or her claim.78  Authority for this 
conclusion may be found in Columbus Joint Venture v ABSA Bank Ltd79 and Energy 
Measurements (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd.80 In Columbus 
Joint Venture v ABSA Bank Ltd, Malan J81 did not find it necessary to deal with the 
plaintiff's contributory fault, but quoted Booysen J's82 submission in Wapnick v 
Durban City Garage83 that "a plaintiff who has intentionally contributed to his own 
damage cannot claim his own damage or part of it from a defendant on the ground 
ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1997 2 SA 591 (W) 606; Netherlands Insurance Co of SA Ltd v 
Van der Vyver 1968 1 SA 412 (A) 421-422; Dendy 1998 THRHR 516. 
76  Botha Verdeling van Skadedragingslas 315.  
77  See Wapnick v Durban City Garage 1984 2 SA 414 (D); Columbus Joint Venture v ABSA Bank Ltd 
2000 2 SA 491 (W); Boberg Delict 656; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 162-163; Ahmed 2010 
THRHR 701. 
78  See Wapnick v Durban City Garage 1984 2 SA 414 (D) 418; Columbus Joint Venture v ABSA 
Bank Ltd 2000 2 SA 491 (W) 512-513; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 163 n 230; cf Du Bois et al 
Wille's Principles of South African Law 1148; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 244; 
Boberg Delict 656; Malan and Pretorius 1997 THRHR 156; Ahmed 2010 THRHR 701-702. 
79  Columbus Joint Venture v ABSA Bank Ltd 2000 2 SA 491 (W). 
80  Energy Measurements (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of South Africa 2000 2 All SA 396 (W) 
81  Columbus Joint Venture v ABSA Bank Ltd 2000 2 SA 491 (W) 513. 
82  Wapnick v Durban City Garage 1984 (2) SA 414 (D) 418. 
83  Wapnick v Durban City Garage 1984 (2) SA 414 (D). 
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of the latter's conduct".84 The trial court therefore confirmed that in cases where a 
plaintiff intentionally contributes to his or her own loss, such a plaintiff cannot have 
a claim against a negligent defendant. In Energy Measurements (Pty) Ltd v First 
National Bank of South Africa Ltd,85 the plaintiff's employee acted with intent but the 
court held that the employee was not acting within the course and scope of his 
employment and that therefore the plaintiff was not "vicariously liable" for the acts 
of its employee. In this way the court, as in the case of Columbus Joint Venture v 
ABSA Bank Ltd, avoided the application of section 1 of the Act by ascribing a narrow 
interpretation to "scope of employment".86  
2.1.3.3  Could a plaintiff who has intentionally contributed to his or her own loss 
succeed with a claim against a defendant who intentionally caused the 
plaintiff's loss?87  
Here the law remained unsettled for a long time,88 since the Act was applied only to 
contributory negligence and the courts were never directly confronted with instances 
where both parties acted intentionally. However, when such a case came before the 
court,89 it had no other option but to serve justice, even though the Act did not 
provide in clear terms for fault in the form of intent. This occurred in Greater 
84  Columbus Joint Venture v ABSA Bank Ltd 2000 2 SA 491 (W) 513. 
85  Energy Measurements (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of South Africa 2000 2 All SA 396 (W). 
86  SALRC Project 96 20-21.  
87  See Mabaso v Felix 1981 3 SA 865 (A); Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v 
ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1996 4 All SA 278 (W); Neethling and Potgieter Delict 162-163; 
Ahmed 2010 THRHR 702. 
88  It was debatable whether or not a defendant could raise a plea of "contributory intent". See 
Minister van Wet en Orde v Ntsane 1993 1 SA 560 (A) 569; Wapnick v Durban City Garage 1984 
2 SA 414 (D) 418; Netherlands Insurance Co of SA Ltd v Van der Vyver 1968 1 SA 412 (A) 422; 
Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 244 n 3; Kelly 2001 SA Merc LJ 514; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 163; Du Bois et al Wille's Principles of South African Law 1148; Ahmed 2010 
THRHR 702. 
89  See Mabaso v Felix 1981 3 SA 865 (A), where according to the facts it seems that both the 
plaintiff and defendant acted with intent. The court held (876) held that the defendant (on 
whom the onus rested) failed in his defence or that there was fault on the part of the plaintiff 
(877). Goldstein J correctly remarked in Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1997 2 SA 594 (W) 608 that this judgment did not contain an 
analysis of the evidence and that the obiter dictum was intended to apply where the conduct of 
the plaintiff amounted to negligence. The plaintiff's intentional conduct was not taken into 
account and the Appellate Division merely stated the rule of common law that an intention to 
injure negates all defences. See also Scott 1997 De Jure 392. 
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Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd,90 where it was 
held that a defence of contributory intent could be raised in instances where the 
plaintiff and the defendant acted with intention, and that "fault" includes intent. 
Goldstein J91 submitted: 
In my view the word 'fault' and its Afrikaans counterpart 'skuld' clearly includes 
dolus (the Appellate Division left this issue open in Minister van Wet en Orde en 'n 
Ander v Ntsane 1993 (1) SA 560 (A) at 569H). It should be noted that I have to do 
with a situation of dolus on both sides since both the plaintiff's servant, Mr [T], and 
the defendant's servant [W] intentionally caused the harm which befell the plaintiff. 
Thus I do not have to consider the case where the plaintiff's fault may be 
negligence and that of the defendant dolus, or where the plaintiff has dolus and the 
defendant is merely negligent … Where there is dolus on both sides there appears 
to me to be no reason not to give effect to the ordinary meaning of the words 
'fault' and 'skuld'. In reaching this conclusion … I am not unmindful of the 
references to negligence in the long title of the Act, the headings of Chapter 1 and 
section 1. 
Goldstein J92 continued that "in the present matter my interpretation leads to no 
absurdity, inconsistency, hardship or anomaly. The contrary is true. Applying section 
1(1)(a) in the present matter produces a result which is fair and which the language 
of the statutes indicates the legislature must have intended". He93 referred to the 
dictum of Mahomed J,94 who found that "'fault' in section 2 of the Act includes dolus 
… the legislature would probably have intended the word to mean the same in both 
section 1 and 2". The plaintiff's claim was reduced in terms of section 1(1)(a) of the 
Act by 50 per cent. 
Scott95 submits that this judgment offers a sound example of how well-established 
rules should be applied. He questions how Goldstein J came to a 50/50 per cent 
apportionment, but commends it as equitable, for both parties are equally to blame. 
Scott submits that if one were to argue that to act intentionally represents a 100 per 
90  Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1996 
4 All SA 278 (W). 
91  Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1996 
4 All SA 278 (W) 291. 
92  Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1996 
4 All SA 278 (W) 292. 
93  Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1996 
4 All SA 278 (W) 294. 
94  In Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W). 
95  Scott 1997 De Jure 393. 
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cent deviation from the norm of the reasonable man,96 then in instances where both 
parties acted intentionally with regard to the plaintiff's loss one can mathematically 
conclude "100% : 100% = 100:100 = 1:1(2). An apportionment (reduction) of ½ 
(50%) is thus warranted". Scott predicts that it is merely a matter of time before the 
courts will be faced with the issue of weighing up different forms of dolus.97 Malan 
and Pretorius98 suggest that the conclusion reached by Goldstein J is correct and in 
accordance with a view that is jurisprudentially justifiable.99 The express recognition 
of the existence of the defence of contributory intent is welcomed by them.100 
This case is the first case that officially recognises the applicability of the defence of 
contributory intent101 within the ambit of section 1 of the Act and can be the 
authority and basis for further future development of the defence by our courts. 
2.2  Section 2 of the Act 
Section 2 of the Act applies to joint wrongdoers, currently defined as persons who 
are jointly or severally liable in delict for the same damage to the plaintiff.102 What is 
relevant in regard to this section and the defence of "contributory intent" is the 
practical manner in which the courts apportion damages between intentional 
wrongdoers or intentional and negligent wrongdoers, as this may be of assistance in 
apportioning damages in instances where the plaintiff acted intentionally and the 
defendant negligently, or where both the defendant and the plaintiff acted 
intentionally.103 
For the purposes of this contribution it is important to note that section 2 provides 
for the recognition and regulation of a right of contribution between joint 
96  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 163 n 233. 
97  Scott 1997 De Jure 393-394. 
98  Malan and Pretorius 1997 THRHR 159. 
99  They refer to Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 153 fn 170; Pretorius Medewerkende Opset 
223 n 1. 
100  See also Neethling and Potgieter Delict 173. Loubser et al Delict 439 submits that, presuming 
both parties acted intentionally, the situation would be no different to the situation where both 
parties are  negligent. 
101  SALRC Project 96 20. 
102  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 265.  
103  See Ahmed 2010 THRHR 702. 
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wrongdoers who are jointly and severally liable in delict for the same damage.104 If 
the court is satisfied that all the joint wrongdoers are before it, it may apportion the 
damages among them on the basis of their relative degrees of fault, and may give 
judgment against every wrongdoer for his part of the damages.105 
Unlike section 1, there is nothing in section 2 which indicates that liability is limited 
to negligent wrongdoing only.106 The nature of the joint wrongdoers' fault does not 
affect liability. So it is irrelevant that one wrongdoer's fault is in the form of intention 
while the other's is in the form of negligence.107 Either of the wrongdoers is liable for 
the full extent of the loss.108 
The courts (with regard to the application of section 2 of the Act relating to 
wrongdoers) were faced with instances analogous to those faced with section 1 of 
the Act, where one wrongdoer acted negligently and the other intentionally,109 or 
where both acted intentionally. In Holscher v ABSA Bank110 and ABSA Bank Ltd v 
Bond Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd111 section 2 of the Act was not applied; but in 
Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd112 the court 
recognised that apportionment of liability could be applied between joint wrongdoers 
who acted intentionally, and in Lloyd-Grey Lithographers (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank t/a 
Nedbank113 that apportionment of liability could be applied between joint 
wrongdoers where one wrongdoer acted intentionally and the other negligently. In 
Lloyd-Grey Lithographers (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank t/a Nedbank, Boruchowitz J114 held 
that there is "no reason in principle as to why there cannot be an apportionment of 
104  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 265; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 246. 
105  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 266. 
106  See Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W) 619-
621; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 246-247. 
107  Kotze1956 THRHR 192 also submits that with regard to s 2 of the Act, it should be assumed that 
joint wrongdoers (for purposes of the Act) are persons who are jointly and severally liable 
whether their wrongdoing is based on negligence or intent. 
108  ABSA Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pty) Ltd 2001 1 SA 372 (SCA) para 11; Nedcor Bank Ltd t/a 
Nedbank v Lloyd-Gray Lithographers (Pty) Ltd 2000 4 SA 915 (SCA) para 11; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Principles of Delict 248 n 35. 
109  See Lloyd-Gray Lithographers (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank t/a Nedbank 1998 2 SA 667 (W). 
110  Holscher v ABSA Bank 1994 2 SA 667 (T). 
111  ABSA Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd 2001 1 SA 372 (SCA). 
112  Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W). 
113  Lloyd-Gray Lithographers (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank t/a Nedbank 1998 2 SA 667 (W). 
114  Lloyd-Gray Lithographers (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank t/a Nedbank 1998 2 SA 667 (W) 672-673. 
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liability where one joint wrongdoer has acted intentionally and the other negligently. 
Intention and negligence are not mutually exclusive concepts. It is logically possible 
for both to be present simultaneously". He115 referred to S v Zoko116 where it was 
held that dolus is merely a species or a particular form of blameworthiness which 
constitutes culpa. Boruchowitz J117 concluded: 
[A]pportioning liability between intentional and negligent wrongdoers is not an 
impossible task. It is a question of assessing the relative degrees of 
blameworthiness. In so doing the Court is not required to act with precision or 
exactitude but to assess the matter in accordance with what it considers to be just 
and equitable. 
Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd,118 is the locus 
classicus for the view that the Act also applies to intentional, as opposed to 
negligent, joint wrongdoers. In light of the facts of the case, Mahomed J made some 
important submissions119 with regard to section 2 of the Act. He120 held that "it is 
clear that a delict may in our law be perpetrated by an intentional act of 
wrongdoing", and further stated that section "2(1) of the Act refers to delicts in 
general terms, and nowhere in the Act is there a qualification which limits the 
contribution which the joint wrongdoer might claim from another wrongdoer to 
delictual acts performed negligently but not intentionally".121 
It was submitted on behalf of the third parties in the matter that in the context in 
which the word "fault" is used in section 2 of the Act, dolus must be excluded. In 
answer to this argument Mahomed J122 stated: 
Apportioning liability between joint tortfeasors is very often a difficult exercise, but I 
am not persuaded that the difficulty becomes insuperable merely because the 
delictual act concerned was intentional. There can be degrees of culpability even 
between different joint wrongdoers perpetrating an intentional act which attracts 
delictual liability. There is, for example, a clear difference between the kind of 
intention which is inferred from dolus eventualis on the one hand and dolus 
directus on the other. Even between different wrongdoers whose intention is to be 
115  Lloyd-Grey Lithographers (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank t/a Nedbank 1998 2 SA 667 (W) 673. 
116  S v Zoko 1983 1 SA 871 (N) 896. 
117  Lloyd-Gray Lithographers (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank t/a Nedbank 1998 2 SA 667 (W) 673. 
118  Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W). 
119  Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W) 622. 
120  Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W) 619. 
121  Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W) 620. 
122  Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W) 620-621. 
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inferred from a dolus eventualis there are different gradations of culpability. This is 
one of the reasons why the Legislature probably provided that what the court had 
eventually to do was to apportion the damages against the joint wrongdoers in 
such proportions as the court "may deem just and equitable". 
The importance of this case is that the court held that section 2 of the Act also 
applies to intentional, as opposed to only negligent, joint wrongdoers and further 
that the difficulty in apportioning liability between two joint wrongdoers who acted 
intentionally could be overcome by taking into account their respective degrees of 
culpability. This decision is welcomed123 and no doubt can be of aid to the defence of 
contributory intent where the defendant also acted intentionally, as the same 
principles in calculating apportionment between joint wrongdoers can be applied to 
the plaintiff and the defendant. Of importance, the decision of Lloyd-Grey 
Lithographers (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank t/a Nedbank provides a workable solution to 
the difficulty of apportioning liability between joint wrongdoers as well as between 
the plaintiff and the defendant where they have different forms of fault. Lloyd-Grey 
Lithographers (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank t/a Nedbank like Greater Johannesburg and 
Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd provide enough 
fertile ground for the courts to develop the defence of "contributory intent" as a 
defence limiting liability and to take note of the fact that it is not impossible to 
apportion damages in instances of intentional wrongdoing. 
Neethling124 argues that although an apportionment of damages in accordance with 
the blameworthiness of each joint wrongdoer in regard to the damage appears, on 
the face of it, impossible where the same damage was caused intentionally by one 
party and negligently by the other party, such apportionment is nevertheless 
possible if one accepts the view expressed in S v Ngubane125 that if a wrongdoer 
123  Neethling 1998 THRHR 519-520 supports the judgment of Mahomed J and submits that the key 
to the decision was that as the Act radically deviated from the common law and did not limit its 
application to negligent wrongdoers, the words "liable in delict" in terms of s 2(1) include delicts 
committed negligently as well intentionally. Potgieter 1998 THRHR 732 argues that a case can be 
made to the effect that an intentional wrongdoer and a negligent wrongdoer causing the same 
damage to a third party do not qualify as joint wrongdoers for purposes of the Act. He (Potgieter 
1998 THRHR 740) further submits that the outcome of this decision better satisfies one's sense 
of justice but still amounts to the incorrect application of the Act. Kelly 2001 SA Merc LJ 520 is 
comfortable with the Act applying to intentional joint wrongdoers. 
124  Neethling 1998 THRHR 520. 
125  S v Ngubane 1985 3 SA 677 (A). 
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acts with intent, negligence on his part will simultaneously also be present. 
Moreover, if one further accepts that the intentional causing of harm to another 
would generally amount to a deviation of at least 100 per cent from the norm of the 
reasonable person, apportionment between joint wrongdoers can also take place on 
the basis of the criterion for the apportionment of damages in terms of s 1(1)(a) of 
the Act, as accepted by Jones v Santam Ltd.126 This is done by reflecting the 
wrongdoers' degree of deviation from the norm of the reasonable person expressed 
as a percentage.127 Neethling supports Mahomed J's128 submission that in 
determining the ratio of apportionment, the degree of culpability or blameworthiness 
of the intentional wrongdoer should be taken into account. Mahomed J's submission 
is logical in the sense that a wrongdoer acting with dolus eventualis might probably 
be less culpable than a wrongdoer acting with dolus directus. The blameworthiness 
of joint wrongdoers with the same form of intent might even differ. This factor will 
consequently lead to an intentional act not always signifying a 100 per cent 
deviation from the norm of the reasonable person, with the result that two 
intentional wrongdoers might in a certain instance be in a ratio of apportionment of 
100:120 (dolus eventualis: dolus directus), or an intentional (dolus directus) and a 
negligent wrongdoer, for example, in the ratio 120:60.129  
3  Legal reform 
3.1  Report of the South African Law  Reform Commission 
The South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) was tasked with the review of 
the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 (the "Act") and published a report 
thereon in July 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the "Report"). In the summary of the 
Report130 the following statement is of relevance: 
126  Jones v Santam Ltd 1965 2 SA 542 (A). 
127  Neethling 1998 THRHR 520. 
128  Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W) 620. 
129  See Neethling 1998 THRHR 521. The negligent causing of harm could amount up to a deviation 
of 100 per cent from the norm of a reasonable person, whereas the intentional causing of harm 
would amount to a deviation of 100 per cent (or more) from the norm of a reasonable person 
(depending on the form of intent). 
130  SALRC Project 96 xi-xvi. 
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Since the Act was passed, there have been major developments in the law of delict 
... These changes in the law of delict were not envisaged by the legislature at the 
time of the enactment of the Act. The Act has been unable to accommodate these 
developments and this has led to anomalies in this area of the law ... Under the Act 
fault is the sole criterion of apportionment. The courts have traditionally interpreted 
fault in the Act to mean negligence and to exclude intentional wrongdoing. The 
Commission recommends that so far as fault is used as a basis for or factor in 
apportionment, it should include both intention and negligence. This is achieved in 
the draft Bill by using the term 'fault' in section 3(2)(b)(iii) in its ordinary and 
accepted sense of including both intention and negligence and by expressly 
referring to intention in the definition of 'wrong' in section 1 ... The Commission 
advocates a broader basis for apportionment than fault[,] ... fault should be one of 
a wide range of relevant factors which the courts are to consider in attributing 
responsibility for the loss suffered ... The court is left with a complete discretion 
with regard to the method of determining appropriate proportions having regard to 
all relevant factors. Responsibility means more than fault and will allow the courts 
to consider a much wider range of factors including the causative potency of the 
parties' acts. 
With regard to the need for reform, the Report pointed out that there have been 
attempts to apply the Act to areas which were not and could not have been 
envisaged by the legislature at the time of the enactment of the Act but that in 
respect of Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd and 
Lloyd-Gray Lithographers (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank Ltd t/a Nedbank justice was 
served.131 In contrast, "the decisions in the cases which strictly adhered to the 
correct interpretation of the Act as applying only to negligent conduct did not 
produce fair or equitable results". But it is "undesirable that the courts must search 
outside the confines of the Act for grounds for a just and equitable basis for 
apportionment while they incorrectly assert that the Act justifies their findings".132 
Fortunately, the Report133 recommends that "fault" include both intention and 
negligence and expressly refers to intention in the definition of "wrong" in section 1.  
"Wrong" means: 
an act or omission giving rise to a loss that constitutes- 
(a) a delict; 
(b) a breach of a statutory duty; or 
(c) a breach of a duty of care arising from a contract, 
Whether or not it is intentional. 
131  SALRC Project 96 26. 
132  SALRC Project 96 26. 
133  SALRC Project 96 27. 
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This seems also to be the trend in other countries.134 For example, the New Zealand 
Law Commission135 with regard to the "Apportionment of Civil Liability Act" 
recommends that the: 
Act is to apply whether or not the act or omission causing the loss was deliberate 
on the part of the wrongdoer. The fact that the defendant's act was deliberate may 
sometimes lead the court in its discretion to determine that no contribution shall be 
ordered in favour of that person. But it would not be an absolute bar. The 
consequences of the deliberate act may not have been intended. The negligent 
behaviour of a co-defendant may have played a more significant part in the 
plaintiff's loss.136 
Section 5 of the draft Civil Liability and Contribution Act similarly states that "the Act 
applies whether or not the act or omission on which liability is based is intentional, 
and whether or not such act or omission constitutes a crime".137 In Canada, the 
Ontario Law Reform Commission in their report on "contribution among wrongdoers 
and contributory negligence"138 also makes it clear that their proposed draft Act by 
its definition of "fault" includes all torts, whether or not intentional.139 
It is of great importance that the SALRC advocates not only that contributory intent 
is also relevant when apportioning damages but, even more significantly, a broader 
basis for apportionment than fault. Thus other factors may also be taken into 
account and the court has a discretion with regard to the method of determining 
appropriate proportions in respect of the "responsibility" of each party for the 
damages. Van Heerden JA in General Accident Insurance Company SA Bpk v Uijs140 
was also in favour of this broader approach when seeking "justice and equity" with 
regard to the apportionment of liability.141 Potgieter142 urges the legislature to act 
quickly to identify lacunae in the law and rectify them. Therefore priority should be 
134  See SALRC Project 96 24-25. 
135  NZLC Preliminary Paper 19 83. 
136  SALRC Project 96 24-25. 
137  As of yet, the Bill has not been promulgated and according to the Government's response the 
"Minister of Justice does not currently have the resources available to assess" the report (New 
Zealand Law Commission 1998 http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/project/civil-contribution). 
138  Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Contribution among Wrongdoers. 
139  SALRC Project 96 25. 
140 General Accident Versekeringsmaatskappy SA Bpk v Uijs 1993 4 SA 228 (A). Also see Neethling 
and Potgieter 1994 THRHR 131. 
141  General Accident Insurance Company SA Bpk v Uijs 1993 4 SA 228 (A) 229. 
142  Potgieter 1998 THRHR 518; SALRC Project 96 26. 
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given to the revision of the law in this area. Even though the Bill143 has been 
prepared to replace the current Act, it has unfortunately not yet been promulgated – 
just over ten years have passed since the Report of the SALRC was published, and 
this notwithstanding the current Act's shortcomings, inter alia as regards intentional 
wrongdoing. 
4  Comparative law 
In this paragraph it is intended to ascertain whether and to what extent contributory 
intent has been recognised as a defence limiting (or excluding) delictual liability in a 
few foreign legal systems. English and Australian law will be considered as well as a 
few European legal systems. 
4.1  English law  
The English law of torts follows a casuistic approach and therefore recognises 
specific torts with their own rules.144 Thus a wrongdoer can be liable only if all the 
requirements for the specific tort are met.145 For some torts intention is required, 
but it is possible to commit other torts such as trespass and defamation negligently 
as well as intentionally. Apportionment with respect to tort law is regulated by the 
Contributory Negligence Act.146 Wherever an interest is protected by a tort of 
negligence it is probable that it will also be protected by an intentional tort. For 
example, with regard to a careless false statement, liability would be based on 
negligence, and with regard to an intentional false statement, liability would be in 
deceit. However, an intentional act such as trespass might also result from a 
careless decision made by the defendant and give rise to liability in both negligence 
and trespass. Where there is intentional interference with a person's trading 
relationships under the economic torts, there is no room for negligent liability in 
respect of such interests.147 
143  Apportionment of Loss Bill 2003. 
144  In our law general principles or requirements regulate delictual liability irrespective of which 
individual interest is impaired or the manner in which it is impaired (Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 4). 
145  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 4. 
146  Williams Joint Torts 197-198. 
147  Clerk and Lindsell Torts 382. 
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It is established that fault in terms of the Contributory Negligence Act148 extends to 
intentional acts on the part of the plaintiff in those cases where the defendant has a 
duty to prevent deliberate self-harm by the plaintiff.149 In Reeves v Commissioner of 
Police for the Metropolis,150 even though the deceased acted with contributory intent 
and the defendant with negligence, the court did not hold that there was a break in 
the causal link thereby excluding damages, but apportioned the damages (the 
dependants of the deceased were entitled to 50 per cent of their claim).151 
Section 1 (1) of the Contributory Negligence Act152 states: 
Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of 
the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not 
be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the 
damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the 
court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimants share in the 
responsibility for the damage. 
According to section 4, "fault means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other 
act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort or would, apart from this Act, 
give rise to a defence of contributory negligence". 
The assessment of contribution according to the Contributory Negligence Act 
depends on "an amalgamation of causation" and legal "blameworthiness".153 The Act 
itself refers to "share in the responsibility"154 whereas our Act is based only on 
fault.155 
Generally in instances where the defendant intentionally caused the plaintiff harm or 
loss, contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff cannot be raised (this is also 
the position in our common law and case law).156 The exclusion of the defence 
conforms to public policy in that the defendant's wrongful intention outweighs the 
148  Contributory Negligence Act 1945. 
149  Clerk and Lindsell Torts 176. 
150  Reeves v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 2000 1 AC 360. 
151  Clerk and Lindsell Torts 176. 
152  Contributory Negligence Act 1945. 
153  Rogers in Magnus and Martin-Casals Contributory Negligence 61. 
154  See s 1 Contributory Negligence Act 1945. 
155  See s 1 Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
156  See para 2.1.3.1 above. 
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plaintiff's negligence so as to cancel any responsibility on the part of the plaintiff.157 
It should be noted, though, that in cases where the defendant's fault is in the form 
of intention, it does not automatically exclude apportionment in terms of the 
Contributory Negligence Act.158 A person who willingly participates in a fight may 
have his or her damages reduced, as may a criminal who is met with excessive force 
by the victim. But a person who commits fraud cannot raise contributory negligence 
on the part of the victim who did not take adequate steps to check what he or she 
was told.159 
In instances where both parties act intentionally it seems that apportionment is not 
applicable. For example, in Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping 
Corp (No 4),160 Oakprime intended to sell a cargo of bitumen to Vietnamese buyers. 
Payment was to be confirmed by Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) in the form of a 
"banker's confirmed credit", which requires strict compliance with regard to shipping 
documentation. As Oakprime was late in obtaining the cargo, it procured Pakistan 
National Shipping (PNS) (carriers) to put a false date on the bill of lading. SCB did 
not know about the false date on the bill of lading but noticed other discrepancies. 
SCB nevertheless decided to pay and did not notify the issuing bank of the 
discrepancies. The issuing bank upon receiving the documents noticed other 
discrepancies and declined to reimburse SCB. The cargo was assigned by the issuing 
bank to SCB, which subsequently sold it at a substantial loss. SCB sued PNS for 
fraud as Oakprime had ceased to trade. PNS responded that "[y]es, we knowingly 
misled you. But you paid us because you intended to get reimbursed by the issuing 
bank and you had already decided to mislead the issuing bank by concealing other 
discrepancies. Admittedly you failed in that scheme but the loss you suffered is at 
least partly your fault." According to a majority decision of the Court of Appeal, it 
was held that PNS's contention was defeated by the rule that contributory 
negligence could not apply to a claim of fraud (intentional wrongdoing).161 This 
157  Williams Joint Torts 198. 
158  Contributory Negligence Act 1945. 
159  Horton Rogers "Contributary Negligence under English Law" 61-62. 
160  Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (No 4) 2002 UKHL 43; 2003 1 AC 
959; Horton Rogers "Contributary Negligence under English Law" 62 n 21. 
161  Horton Rogers "Contributary Negligence under English Law" 62. 
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decision conformed to a strict interpretation of the Act applying to contributory 
negligence only. 
In instances where the defendant did play a part in the chain of events which led to 
the loss but the effective legal cause of the harm was due to the claimants "own 
folly", such claimants' conduct cannot amount to 100 per cent contributory 
negligence. Instead a plea of "no cause" is stated.162 
In the case of mild provocation by the claimant, who is then seriously assaulted by 
two joint wrongdoers (the defendants), it seems that it is highly unlikely that a court 
would consider contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff as a defence to limit the 
joint wrongdoers' liability.163 
Although contributory intent is not per se recognised as a defence in English law, it 
is recognised by implication. Contributory intent is either subsumed under consent164 
or under contributory negligence. In instances where a plaintiff clearly acts with 
intent and the defendant allegedly with negligence, apportionment (as opposed to 
exclusion) is applied as in Reeves v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis. Thus 
the plaintiff's contributory intent falls within the ambit of contributory negligence 
thereby limiting liability. In instances where the defendant acts with intention and 
the plaintiff with negligence, public policy demands that the defendant be solely 
liable. In instances where both parties act intentionally it seems that apportionment 
is not applicable, as in Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp 
(No 4). 
4.2  Australian law  
Contributory fault in Australia is regulated by common law as well as by statute. The 
legislation regulating the apportionment of fault in Australia is based on the English 
Contributory Negligence Act.165 The prescribed criterion is the plaintiff's "share of 
162  Horton Rogers "Contributary Negligence under English Law" 60. 
163  See Surtees v Kingston on Thames BC 1992 PIQR 101; Horton Rogers "Contributary Negligence 
under English Law" 71. 
164  Williams Joint Torts 197-198. 
165  Contributory Negligence Act 1945; Fleming Torts 306. 
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responsibility" and paramount is the element of fault.166 A comparison of the 
plaintiff's and defendant's fault is taken into account in assessing damages awarded 
to the plaintiff.167 The degrees of fault may range from trivial inadvertence to the 
grossest recklessness. For example, deliberate disregard for safety rules will be 
judged more severely than merely imperfect reaction to a crisis (compare a driver 
who deliberately cuts a corner to one who merely fails to react promptly to an 
emergency). Causal responsibility is relevant. For example, the main blame must fall 
on the person who created the danger or brought to the accident the dangerous 
subject matter, since he was in a sense responsible for the situation.168 Although 
there is authority from the High Court to the effect that a reduction of 100 per cent 
is not possible,169 statutes in most jurisdictions now expressly allow this.170 Generally 
the plaintiff's contributory fault is calculated with reference to the degree of 
departure of the plaintiff's action from the standard of the reasonable person and 
the relative causal contribution of the plaintiff's negligence to the damage.171 In 
modern Australian law there is a greater flexibility offered to courts by the 
apportionment legislation where contributory negligence as opposed to volenti non 
fit iniuria is established, especially now that the plaintiff's damage may in some 
jurisdictions be reduced by 100 per cent.172 In cases where the plaintiff acted 
intentionally (or was not prevented from acting intentionally), a question has been 
raised: should the plaintiff's loss resulting from the plaintiff's own intentional conduct 
afford the defendant a defence (based on ex turpi causa non oritur actio)? Here a 
negative answer has been given in cases where prison authorities have negligently 
failed to prevent a person in their custody from committing suicide.173 
166  Fleming Torts 307-308. 
167  Fleming Torts 307. 
168  Fleming Torts 308. 
169  Wynbergen v Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd 1997 149 ALR 25. 
170  The exceptions are South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory (Trindade, 
Cane and Lunney Torts 689-690 n 75). 
171  Trindade, Cane and Lunney Torts 690. 
172  Trindade, Cane and Lunney Torts 697. 
173  Kirkham v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police 1990 2 QB 283. This decision is 
echoed in Reeves v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 2000 1 AC 360, where the patient 
was found to be of unsound mind (Trindade, Cane and Lunney Torts 704 n 173). 
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In principle even if the defendant were careless, it is possible that the plaintiff's 
conduct would be held to be the sole cause of the damage, but such a finding is 
unlikely where both parties have been at fault.174 As far as the plaintiff's conduct is 
concerned it must amount to "contributory negligence" for apportionment to apply, 
although the term "fault" is still used in some jurisdictions. The defendant must 
commit a "wrong" or be at "fault" before the apportionment provisions apply. Under 
the original State legislation the definition of fault was limited to torts to which 
contributory "negligence" had been a defence at common law. In some jurisdictions 
this remains the position while in others the legislation appears to limit 
apportionment to claims of "fault"-based torts.175 
It has been held that the apportionment legislation is not applicable to intentional 
torts such as assault, battery, conversion and deceit, which suggests that the 
defence is available only where the liability is based on negligence. The defence of 
contributory negligence is generally denied where the defendant acted intentionally 
while the plaintiff acted negligently176 (as in our law).177 In Western Australia, 
apportionment applies to "any claim for damages founded on an allegation of 
negligence". This probably excludes intentional or strict liability torts.178 In South 
Australia the legislation refers to "breaches of duties of care" arising under tort 
before damages can be apportioned. "Duty of care" refers to the exercise of 
reasonable care (referring to negligence). In Tasmania and Western Australia, 
apportionment legislation is applicable even if the negligence of the plaintiff is 
vicarious.179 
It seems that Australian law follows English law, in that there is a reluctance to 
acknowledge contributory intent per se as a defence limiting liability. In instances 
where a defendant acts intentionally and the plaintiff negligently, contributory 
174  McKew v Holland & Hannen 1970 171 CLR 506 (Trindade, Cane and Lunney Torts 688 n 58). 
175  Trindade, Cane and Lunney Torts 688 n 61 refer to s 3 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence 
and Apportionment Liability) Act 2001. The Tasmanian legislation applies apportionment for any 
tortious liability, see s 2 Wrongs Act 1954. 
176  Williams Joint Torts 198; Trindade, Cane and Lunney Torts 689 n 66. 
177  See para 2.1.3.1 above. 
178  S 54(7) Wrongs Act 1954; see s 3 of Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors' 
Contribution) Act 1947; Trindade, Cane and Lunney Torts 689 n 69.  
179  Trindade, Cane and Lunney Torts 689.  
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negligence cannot apply as a defence. In instances where a plaintiff acts 
intentionally and the defendant negligently, depending on the circumstances of the 
case, it is possible that the plaintiff's conduct could either exclude or limit liability. 
4.3  Israeli law  
Generally, contributory fault constitutes a statutory defence which is incorporated in 
the Civil Wrongs Ordinance (CWO) and applies to reduce the compensation awarded 
to the plaintiff, but in certain cases the plaintiff's contributory fault may amount to 
100 per cent, thereby negating the defendant's liability. In such cases liability may 
also be extinguished on the ground of lack of causation, namely that the plaintiff's 
contributory negligent conduct was the decisive causal factor. The defence of 
contributory negligence operates in favour of the negligent defendant based on 
objective fault. Where liability is strict or in cases of intentional torts the application 
of the defence raises both theoretical and practical difficulties.180 
Section 68181 of the CWO182 provides: 
Where any person suffers damage as a result partly of his own fault and partly of 
the fault of another person, a claim for compensation shall not be defeated by 
reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but compensation 
recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks 
right and just having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the 
damage.183 
With regard to intentional torts, Israeli law recognises the difficulty in allowing a 
defendant who acts in bad faith to benefit from the defence, especially where the 
plaintiff merely acts contributorily negligent. In instances where the defendant 
inflicted the loss intentionally, it is usually unfair and against public policy to apply 
the defence in his favour. The courts may make use of the test of causation in 
finding the defendant's fault as the decisive cause in respect of the loss sustained 
(the defendant's fault negates the causal link between the contributory negligence 
180  Gilead "Contributary Negligence under Israeli Law" 105. 
181   This section, for all intents and purposes, is almost identical to s 1 of the English Contributory 
negligence Act 1945.  
182  Similar to s 1 of our Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 and almost identical to the 
English s 1(1) Contributory Negligence Act 1945. The English and Israeli Act refer to "share in 
responsibility", whereas our Act refers to "fault". Australian legislation relating to apportionment 
is also based on the English Act; see Fleming Torts 306. 
183  See Gilead "Contributary Negligence under Israeli Law" 106 n 8. 
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and the loss in terms of section 64 (2) of the CWO). Another alternative used is to 
determine on the basis of comparing the relative fault of the parties to such an 
extent that the moral blameworthiness of the defendant may amount to 100 per 
cent.184 According to South African law the decisive cause of the damage is no 
longer (last opportunity rule) taken into account and in terms of our common law 
and case law a defendant who acts intentionally in respect of the plaintiff's loss 
cannot raise the plaintiff's contributory fault as a defence.185 
The CWO defines contributory fault as encompassing two elements, namely 
carelessness on the claimant's part and loss suffered by the claimant which was 
caused by the aforementioned carelessness (carelessness and causation).186 The 
standard of care applied to the claimant's carelessness differs from the standard 
applied to the carelessness of the defendant. This is due to policy considerations 
(based on the view that since the standard for reasonable self-protection may be 
lower than the standard for the protection of others, it follows that the standard for 
contributory carelessness may be lower than the standard for carelessness which 
generates liability towards others) and the conflict between the effect of the defence 
upon the defendant's liability and the aim behind his liability. Where the defence 
reduces the defendant's liability in a manner which conflicts with the aim of 
compensation, or deterrence, or loss spreading and so on, the scope of the defence 
may be limited by relaxing the standard of care.187 The effect of relaxing the 
standard of care is that a plaintiff might not be deemed careless when causing harm 
to him or herself.188 
In instances where a claimant intentionally injures him- or herself, two cases of 
suicide in Israeli law yielded two different conclusions, creating ambiguity. In Abu 
Se'ada v the Israeli Police and the Prison Service,189 the state was found negligent 
184  Gilead "Contributary Negligence under Israeli Law" 110. 
185  Pierce v Hau Mon 1944 AD 175 198; Minister van Wet en Orde v Ntsane 1993 1 SA 560 (A) 570. 
186  S 64 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance of 1947 (CWO); Gilead "Contributary Negligence under Israeli 
Law" 107, 113. 
187  Gilead "Contributary Negligence under Israeli Law" 110. 
188  La Nasional Ins CO Ltd v Stanflast Indus 1976 Ltd 1979 33 1 PD 337 340-341; Gilead 
"Contributary Negligence under Israeli Law" 111 n 30. 
189  Abu Se'ada v The Israeli Police and the Prison Service 1997 51 (ii) PD 704; Gilead "Contributary 
Negligence under Israeli Law" 109 n 24. 
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for the failure of the Prison Authority to provide proper medical treatment to a 
prisoner after a failed suicide attempt. As it was unclear whether such proper 
medical treatment could have prevented the loss or not, the Supreme Court held 
that the prisoner should incur 50 per cent of his loss on the basis of the "lost 
chances of healing theory". The court reasoned that the prisoner was contributorily 
negligent. In Hadasa v Gilad190 a patient who was hospitalised after a failed suicide 
attempt, committed suicide while still in the hospital. The hospital was found 
negligent for failure to protect the patient. In this case the Supreme Court denied 
the defence of contributory negligence on two grounds. Firstly, the court reasoned 
that as it was the duty of the hospital to protect the patient from himself: it actually 
assumed the patient's duty of self-care. Secondly, given that the patient was in a 
state of depression, the element of moral fault on his part was absent.191 Yet the 
court acknowledged that suicidal acts may amount to contributory negligence, and 
that each case should be decided on its merits, taking into consideration the 
circumstances of the case.192 Nevertheless, the courts in Israel, Australia and 
England193 prefer to apply apportionment, and therefore contributory intent is 
utilised as a defence limiting liability. 
There may be instances of intentional torts where it is justified to reduce 
compensation within the ambit of contributory negligence, such as where the 
claimant himself wrongfully and intentionally provokes the defendant. In this regard 
the CWO confers upon the court the discretion to reduce the percentage of the 
contribution as the judge may think would be just, where the fault of the defendant 
was brought about by the conduct of the plaintiff.194 Thus it seems that in instances 
where both parties' fault is in the form of intention the court may apportion loss. 
Other examples are where the claimant acted in a careless manner because he or 
190  Hadasa v Gilad 1999 53 (iii) PD 529; Gilead "Contributary Negligence under Israeli Law" 109 n 
25. 
191  It may be argued that moral fault is not a necessary element of the defence which is based on 
an objective criterion of self-protection; Gilead "Contributary Negligence under Israeli Law" 109 n 
26. 
192  The court also denied the defence of assumption of risk, in the absence of free will and the claim 
that the patient's suicidal act negated legal causation between the hospital's negligence and the 
ensuing damage; Gilead "Contributary Negligence under Israeli Law" 110 n 27. 
193  See para 4.1-4.-3. 
194  S 65 of the CWO; Gilead "Contributary Negligence under Israeli Law" 110 n 29. 
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she unexpectedly relied on a fraudulent misrepresentation that no reasonable person 
would rely on. While the test applied to defendants is objective, the one applied to 
claimants is more subjective.195 The CWO gives the courts a wide discretion 
regarding the reduction of compensation. With regard to bodily injuries suffered by 
employees, the courts tend to minimise the employee's share. In cases of pure 
economic loss suffered by a party who is 'strong' in terms of economic stature and 
risk control, the claimant's share of loss would be larger. The test applied by the 
courts to apportion damages is based on moral blameworthiness and relies on the 
deviation from an objective standard. A second test of apportionment is the 
causative contribution of each party to the damage suffered, but such determination 
becomes difficult when both parties' faults are linked in the chain of causation 
leading to the same loss. Courts rarely use the causation test for apportionment 
preferring the relative fault test.196 In the hypothetical case where a plaintiff 
provokes two defendants (who subsequently become jointly and severally liable), it 
seems that in principle the plaintiff's provocation may constitute negligence in terms 
of section 65 of the CWO, but in the case of a severe attack by the joint 
wrongdoers, their fault seems to be the decisive cause of the damage suffered when 
compared with the plaintiff's carelessness (mild provocation), so that the defence of 
contributory negligence according to Israeli law would probably be denied.197 
Israeli law also seems to recognise contributory intent as a defence limiting liability 
but unfortunately deals with it under legislation referring to contributory negligence. 
Israeli law like English law makes use of the test of causation as well as fault in 
apportioning liability. Israeli law, interestingly enough, tends to use an objective test 
for the defendant and a more subjective test for the plaintiff. There seems to be an 
imbalance, and apportionment seems to favour the plaintiff except where the 
plaintiff is financially sounder than the defendant. 
  
195  Gilead "Contributary Negligence under Israeli Law" 111. 
196  Gilead "Contributary Negligence under Israeli Law" 113-114. 
197  Gilead "Contributary Negligence under Israeli Law" 117-118. 
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4.4  German law  
German law analyses fault in a highly abstract manner and distinguishes between 
dolus directus, dolus eventualis, gross negligence, ordinary negligence and light 
negligence (recklessness, which is considered as a slightly more serious form of 
conduct than gross negligence, may even form a separate heading of fault).198 
"Fault of the injured party" includes not only his or her fault in the resulting harm 
but also his or her failure to minimise the consequences after the harmful result.199 
According to German law, contributory intent as a form of fault falls within the ambit 
of contributory negligence.200 Intention is not defined in the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(BGB) but negligence is defined in § 276 II BGB. The legislator has left it to the 
courts and doctrine to explore the meaning of intention (Vorsatz).201 Contributory 
intent on the part of the plaintiff generally excludes the defendant's liability,202 but 
only for those consequences the plaintiff intended to cause or recklessly accepted 
might happen.203 § 254 of the BGB204 provides for a distribution of damage 
according to the degree of responsibility on the side of the tortfeasor (the 
defendant) and on the side of the injured party (the plaintiff). Although the focus is 
primarily on the degree of causation (Verursachung) a process of balancing is 
undertaken by having regard to a set of empirical rules developed by the courts, 
which take into account different possible degrees of fault on both sides (negligence, 
intent and presumed fault, "Maß des beiderseitigen Verschuldens").205 
Intent on the side of the tortfeasor generally, as in South Africa,206 excludes the 
consideration of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, as the damage 
198 Markesinis and Unberath German Law of Torts 83-84. 
199  Markesinis and Unberath German Law of Torts 110. 
200  "Mitverschulden", the legal basis of which forms part of the general rules of the law of 
obligations of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 254, dealt with under the chapter concerning 
compensation of damage in general. See Fedtke and Magnus "Contributary Negligence under 
German Law" 75. 
201  Van Dam European Tort Law 801. 
202  Fedtke and Magnus "Contributary Negligence under German Law" 84.  
203  Van Dam European Tort Law 802. 
204  German Civil Code of 1900. 
205  Fedtke and Magnus "Contributary Negligence under German Law" 83. 
206  See para 2.1.3.1 above. 
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itself and not only the behaviour in question was intended.207 Furthermore, intent on 
the side of the tortfeasor does not affect the duty of the plaintiff to minimise the 
damage. Intent can in instances even exclude gross negligence.208 Where a servant 
acts with intent a master cannot be held vicariously liable for the conduct of its 
servant209 and is therefore not liable.210 Generally, if the plaintiff acted intentionally 
by provoking the injury, compensation is excluded.211 However, in the hypothetical 
case where the plaintiff's mild provocation of one defendant may have been 
aggravated by the fact that his friend (second defendant) was present, providing the 
challenge with some form of publicity, the severe and intentional personal injury 
inflicted upon the plaintiff seems to outweigh the contributory element on the side of 
the plaintiff.212 In instances where both parties acted with either intent or 
negligence, both parties will be equally liable.213 
German law fortunately recognises both forms of fault even if it is dealt with under 
the statute dealing with negligence. The legislator has left it to the courts to 
determine compensation based on both parties' form of fault. German law offers a 
fair solution in that in instances where a plaintiff acts with contributory intent the 
defendant's liability may be excluded or limited depending on the circumstances of 
the case. In German law contributory intent is therefore recognised as a defence 
both excluding and limiting liability. 
4.5  Sw iss law  
Swiss law refers to the plaintiff's contributory fault as "autoresponsibility" – thus in 
the case of contributory negligence it must be viewed as a case of "collision of 
liabilities". The liability of the wrongdoer collides with the autoresponsibility of the 
plaintiff.214 With regard to fault in general, article 2 of the Swiss Civil Code (SCC) 
takes cognisance of "good faith", in that it is abusive to make somebody else 
207  See Fedtke and Magnus "Contributary Negligence under German Law" 84 n 83. 
208  See Fedtke and Magnus "Contributary Negligence under German Law" 84 n 84. 
209  In terms of § 831of the BGB. 
210  See Fedtke and Magnus "Contributary Negligence under German Law" 84 n 85. 
211  §254 no 53; Fedtke and Magnus "Contributary Negligence under German Law" 84 n 89. 
212  Fedtke and Magnus "Contributary Negligence under German Law" 97. 
213  §254 no 53, 54; Fedtke and Magnus "Contributary Negligence under German Law" 84 n 90. 
214  Widmer "Contributary Negligence under Swiss Law" 209. 
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responsible for a damage which the injured party (plaintiff) caused himself. With 
regard to contributory fault there is no definition in Swiss law, but the general idea is 
that where the plaintiff suffers loss, he or she has to bear the loss or harm him- or 
herself to the extent to which it cannot be imputed to others.215 Contributory intent 
in terms of Swiss law is dealt with under contributory negligence.216 Article 44 of the 
Swiss Code of Obligations (SCO) states that the "judge may reduce or refuse 
compensation where the injured person has assented to the injury, or where 
circumstances for which he is responsible have contributed to the occurrence or the 
aggravation of the loss or have otherwise prejudiced the position of the person 
liable".217 
If the plaintiff injures himself intentionally, his contribution will usually be sufficient 
to break the causal link of imputation between the determining act and damaging 
event, so as to exclude the defendant's liability.218 If the defendant's fault is in the 
form of intent this will normally have the effect that the plaintiff's contributory fault 
will be partially, at least, neutralised by the higher intensity of the wrongdoer's 
fault.219 
In the hypothetical case of provoked assault where the plaintiff acts with "mild 
provocation" and the defendants as joint wrongdoers thereafter intentionally hurt 
the plaintiff (according to Swiss law), both defendants would in terms of article 50 of 
the SCO be jointly and severally liable in full to compensate the plaintiff (provided 
the defendants' reaction to the mild provocation is clearly excessive, with a slight 
possible deduction if this was not the case).220 
Swiss law recognises contributory intent in the form of "autoresponsibility" and takes 
cognisance of the principle of abuse of right in that it is abusive to make somebody 
else responsible for a damage which the plaintiff caused himself. The plaintiff's 
215  Widmer "Contributary Negligence under Swiss Law" 210. 
216  Widmer "Contributary Negligence under Swiss Law" 213. 
217  Widmer "Contributary Negligence under Swiss Law" 211. 
218  Widmer "Contributary Negligence under Swiss Law" 214. 
219  Widmer "Contributary Negligence under Swiss Law" 214. 
220  Widmer "Contributary Negligence under Swiss Law" 222. 
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contributory intent is taken into account in apportioning responsibility and the courts 
may exercise their discretion with regard to such apportionment. 
4.6  Spanish law  
Legal doctrine and court decisions in Spanish law refer to contributory fault inter alia 
as "concurrence of faults" and "concurrence of fault of the victim".221 Contributory 
fault results in a reduction of the amount of damages that the (tortfeasor) will have 
to pay. In some instances it can lead to a total exclusion of liability either because 
the damage can be attributed solely to the plaintiff's fault (culpa exclusive de la 
victima) or that not all the requirements to establish liability of the defendant are 
met.222 A definition of "contributory negligence" is found in article 114 of the Spanish 
Penal Code of 1995 which, in relation to tort liability deriving from a crime or a 
misdemeanour, states that "if the victim had contributed with his conduct to the 
occurrence of the damage sustained, the judges or the courts will be able to 
moderate the amount awarded for its reparation or compensation".223 
A reduction as a result of contributory fault operates in all fields of tortious liability 
and is a general rule in Spanish tort law.224 According to Spanish courts and legal 
doctrine, the wilful and conscious conduct of the victim breaks the causal link 
between the conduct of the defendant and the damage sustained. In a case225 
where the deceased intentionally threw himself on the railway tracks, it was held 
that the deceased's wilful conduct broke any causal link between the conduct of the 
defendant and the death of the deceased, but in the case of the mental patient226 
who committed suicide by burning himself with gasoline, the Supreme Court rejected 
the defence of the plaintiff's contributory intent. The court reasoned that the 
deceased had a lack of understanding and free will.227 
221  Martin-Casals and Sole "Contributary Negligence under Spanish Law" 173-174. 
222  Martin-Casals and Sole "Contributary Negligence under Spanish Law" 174. 
223  Martin-Casals and Sole "Contributary Negligence under Spanish Law" 175. 
224  Martin-Casals and Sole "Contributary Negligence under Spanish Law" 176. 
225  STS 5.2 1992 RJ 828 (Martin-Casals and Sole "Contributary Negligence under Spanish Law" 181). 
226  STS 3.4 2001 (Martin-Casals and Sole "Contributary Negligence under Spanish Law" 181). 
227  Martin-Casals and Sole "Contributary Negligence under Spanish Law" 181. 
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In cases where the defendant acts with intent, the contributory negligence of the 
plaintiff is irrelevant and he or she will be entitled to full compensation (like in South 
Africa).228 For example, in one particular case229 a civil servant of the Spanish Post 
Office used his position to steal credit cards that some banks had sent to their clients 
by mail. Once he had the credit cards, the civil servant got in touch with the 
cardholders and, pretending that he was an employee of the bank, obtained their 
secret numbers by telling them that the bank had made changes in their computing 
system. Using this trick he stole considerable amounts of money. The Supreme 
Court held that the state was vicariously liable in tort and did not accept the 
assertion that the lack of care of the cardholders when giving their secret numbers 
amounted to contributory negligence. It was held that although the secret numbers 
had not been given to anyone, their conduct must not be considered negligent as 
the postman used a trick that took them by surprise, thus taking advantage of their 
good faith.230 
The Supreme Court of Spain held that with regard to intentional crimes, provocation 
by the victim cannot reduce compensation in tort liability. For example, where the 
plaintiff had pushed the defendant, starting a fight which did not lead to any 
personal injury, but his ear was bitten only after the fight was over.231 But the court 
may reduce the plaintiff's compensation for provocation where the behaviour of the 
defendants can be regarded as a logical prolongation of the plaintiff's provocation, 
and as long as the court regards their behaviour as negligent and not intentional 
crimes.232 
In Spanish law contributory intent and contributory negligence fall under the general 
term fault. Contributory intent is clearly recognised as a defence excluding liability. If 
the plaintiff acts intentionally while the defendant acts negligently, generally his or 
her wilful and conscious conduct will break the causal link between the conduct of 
228  See para 2.1.3.1 above. 
229  STS 8.6 1995 RJ 4563 (Martin-Casals and Sole "Contributary Negligence under Spanish Law" 
181). 
230  STS 2ª24.9 1966 RJ 6753 (Martin-Casals and Sole "Contributary Negligence under Spanish Law" 
181). 
231  Martin-Casals and Sole "Contributary Negligence under Spanish Law" 194. 
232  Martin-Casals and Sole "Contributary Negligence under Spanish Law" 194. 
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the defendant and the damage sustained (except in cases of the suicide of mentally 
ill patients). In instances where the defendant acts intentionally and the plaintiff 
negligently, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is considered irrelevant and 
he or she will be entitled to full compensation. It seems that in instances where both 
parties act intentionally the plaintiff's compensation will not be easily reduced and 
depends on the defendant's form of intention. 
4.7  Greek law  
Article 300 of the Greek Civil Code is applicable where the plaintiff has contributed 
by his own act or omission to the creation or extent of the damage he or she has 
suffered. In such instances the court may either not award compensation to the 
plaintiff at all or award a reduced amount.233 Generally contributory negligence is 
taken into account where the plaintiff by his or her own conduct caused the damage 
or in instances where he or she just brought about an increase of damage.234 
Contributory negligence is applicable only if there is liability in respect of 
compensation. The plaintiff must have been at fault (even in cases involving strict 
liability) and there must be a causal link between the act or the omission and the 
damage caused. The grounds on which liability may be based are irrelevant as 
damages emanating from all contractual and extra-contractual liability can be 
reduced if contributory negligence arises. If the defendant acts deliberately 
(intentionally), he or she could be found fully liable.235 Vice versa, where the plaintiff 
acts with contributory intent, any fault on the part of the defendant may be 
cancelled due to the plaintiff's fault. If there is liability based on article 300 of the 
Greek Civil Code, the judge may either release the defendant from his liability or 
reduce it. The courts apportion damage by establishing percentages of contribution 
with regard to such damage and may take into account several subjective factors 
such as age, profession, etc.236 
233  Kerameus "Contributary Negligence under Greek Law" 99. 
234  Kerameus "Contributary Negligence under Greek Law" 99. 
235  According to a 300 of the Greek Civil Code; Kerameus "Contributary Negligence under Greek 
Law" 100. 
236  Kerameus "Contributary Negligence under Greek Law" 101. 
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Greek law seems flexible and apportionment applies to all instances of liability. Like 
most other countries, contributory intent is recognised as a defence excluding and 
limiting delictual liability but is dealt with under the ambit of contributory negligence. 
4.8  Summary of comparative law  
As a general rule in all the foreign systems discussed above, in instances where the 
defendant's fault is in the form of intent and the plaintiff's fault is in the form of 
contributory negligence, the intent of the defendant cancels the plaintiff's 
contributory negligence.237 As pointed out in Israeli law,238 it would generally be 
unfair and inconsistent with public policy to allow the defendant to use the 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff to limit liability. This is also the view in 
Spanish law.239 However, it should be noted that intent on the part of the defendant 
does not automatically result in the cancelling of the plaintiff's neglect under all 
circumstances.240 A possible exception to this general rule is, as pointed out in Israeli 
law, cases where the plaintiff relied on a conduct so obviously fraudulent that no 
reasonable person would have relied on it.241 
According to German, Greek, South African, Spanish and Swiss law the plaintiff's 
intent excludes the liability of the negligent defendant.242 In terms of Swiss law it 
would be abusive to make someone else responsible for damage which the plaintiff 
caused himself. Furthermore, the intent of the plaintiff breaks the causal link 
between the conduct of the defendant (tortfeasor) and the damage sustained. 
However, intent on the part of the plaintiff does not always result in the exclusion of 
liability on the part of the defendant. This is especially true in the suicide cases, 
where the legal duty of care (negligence) of the police and the hospital is considered 
237  According to German, Greek, South African, Spanish and Swiss law; Magnus and Martin-Casals 
Contributory Negligence 274 n 134. 
238  See para 4.3 above. 
239  See para 4.6 above with regard to the employee of the Post Office who intentionally 
appropriated credit cards and obtained the PIN numbers from the Bank's clients to appropriate 
money from the client's accounts. The negligent conduct of the Bank's clients was not considered 
(Martin-Casals and Sole "Contributary Negligence under Spanish Law" 181). See also Magnus 
and Martin-Casals Contributory Negligence 274-275. 
240  According to English law; Magnus and Martin-Casals Contributory Negligence 274 n 135. 
241  Magnus and Martin-Casals Contributory Negligence 275. 
242  See Magnus and Martin-Casals Contributory Negligence 275 n 141. 
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to play a role in preventing prisoners or patients from harming themselves or 
committing suicide,243 and the liability of the police and the hospital may therefore 
be limited and not excluded. 
In instances where both parties act intentionally, the fault of both is taken into 
account to reduce the defendant's liability.244 In the case of provoked assault where 
the plaintiff acts with "mild provocation" and the defendants act with intent in 
respect of severely harming the plaintiff, the majority of the countries hold that the 
plaintiff's claim would probably not be reduced since the plaintiff's mild conduct 
cannot justify an intentional attack with severe injuries to the plaintiff.245 
5  Recommendations 
Some foreign systems, such as English, Israeli, Swiss and Spanish law, utilise 
causation to a greater or lesser extent to deal with the issue of contributory intent. 
This occurs where the contributory intent of the plaintiff is of such a nature that it 
breaks the causal link (that is, it constitutes a novus actus interveniens) between the 
defendant's conduct and the consequence. 
A brief exposition of causation as an element of delict in South African law is 
therefore relevant. Causation entails that an act must cause a harmful result.246 A 
distinction is drawn between factual and legal causation.247 The test for factual 
causation is the conditio sine qua non or "but for" test.248 The crucial question is 
whether the consequence would have occurred but for the defendant's conduct. 
Legal causation on the other hand is concerned with the issue of "remoteness" of 
damage. In this regard the so- called flexible test is nowadays applied. According to 
243  Magnus and Martin-Casals Contributory Negligence 275 n 145 refers to the English, German and 
Israeli law. This is also the case in Australian law. See para 4.2 above as well as Spanish law, see 
para 4.6 above; Magnus and Martin-Casals Contributory Negligence 276. 
244  According to South African law and German law, see Magnus and Martin-Casals Contributory 
Negligence 276. 
245  According to German, English, Greek, Israeli, South African, Spanish and Swiss law (Magnus and 
Martin-Casals Contributory Negligence 290 n 287). 
246  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 175; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 197; Loubser et 
al Delict 69. 
247  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 175, 187-188; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 197; 
Loubser et al Delict 70. 
248  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 178; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 198; Loubser et 
al Delict 71. 
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this test it must be ascertained whether a sufficiently close relationship exists 
between the wrongdoer's conduct and the consequence for that consequence to be 
imputed to the wrongdoer in view of policy considerations based on reasonableness, 
fairness and justice.249 For the purposes of this contribution, it is important to 
ascertain whether the contributorily intentional conduct of the plaintiff can constitute 
a novus actus interveniens which may have an effect on the liability of the 
defendant. Although a new intervening cause may also influence factual causation, 
only its influence on legal causation is relevant here. It is noteworthy that a novus 
actus may be brought about by the plaintiff's culpable (intentional) conduct, but only 
if such conduct was not reasonably foreseeable. If the intervening event was 
reasonably foreseeable at the moment of the defendant's act or if it reasonably 
formed part of the risks inherent in the conduct of the defendant, the event may not 
be considered to be a novus actus interveniens.250 Here mention must be made of 
Road Accident Fund v Russell.251 Chetty AJP252 held that even though the deceased's 
act was deliberate, his "mind was impaired to a material degree by the brain injury 
and the resultant depression. Consequently his ability to make a balanced decision 
was deleteriously affected. Hence his act of suicide, though deliberate, did not 
amount to a novus actus interveniens". The court unfortunately followed the English 
principle253 that a person not of sound mind has impaired volition in forming a 
decision to commit suicide and that suicide does not constitute a novus actus 
interveniens.254 Knobel,255 however, argues that in light of the fact that the 
deceased had in actual fact tried to commit suicide twice before he was successful 
showed that his actions were performed with such a level of premeditation, that they 
could have been regarded as a novus actus interveniens. Knobel states that perhaps 
the decision could be justified by the rule that "one must take his victim as he finds 
him" (where one cannot escape liability for harm increased by the weakness of the 
victim). In this case the deceased most certainly acted with contributory intent while 
249  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 190; Loubser et al Delict 91. 
250  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 207-208. 
251  Road Accident Fund v Russell 2001 2 SA 34 (SCA). 
252  Road Accident Fund v Russell 2001 2 SA 34 (SCA) 41. 
253  Here we need only to refer to Reeves v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 2000 1 AC 
360. 
254  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 207 n 232. 
255  Knobel 2004 THRHR 413-414. 
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the driver acted negligently. On close examination, the plaintiff's conduct was not 
reasonably foreseeable and could therefore be considered of such a nature that it 
breaks the legal causal link between the act and the consequence. This approach 
can therefore be used by our courts to exclude liability by reason of the plaintiff's 
contributory intent, but was unfortunately not canvassed in Minister of Safety and 
Security v Madyibi,256 and it is uncertain what the outcome would have been if it 
had. In any case, as in Road Accident Fund v Russell,257 the question as to 
contributory intent on the part of the deceased was not raised.  
The Apportionment of Loss Bill 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the "Bill")258 makes 
the basis of apportionment in terms of section 3 much wider than fault alone. Thus 
the "causative effect" of acts and omissions is one of the factors to be considered in 
determining proportions. Knobel259 interestingly refers to the facts of Mafesa v Parity 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk260  to illustrate how the Bill could apply with regard to 
a novus actus interveniens. In this case the plaintiff had sustained a leg fracture in a 
car accident. It was set in splints and plasters. He was given crutches and warned 
upon discharge from the hospital not to put weight on the leg. He then negligently 
fell on the slippery floor and broke his leg again, which required a second operation. 
The court held that the plaintiff's careless act was a novus actus interveniens and did 
not hold the insurer of the negligent driver liable for the second fracture. This 
decision confirms the all-or-nothing approach to the novus actus interveniens 
currently applied in our law, as submitted by Knobel. In light of the Bill there is the 
possibility that the apportionment of damages with regard to the second fracture 
could have taken place between the plaintiff and the insurer of the negligent driver. 
Knobel261 warns, however, that with the wide discretion given to the courts in terms 
of the Bill there will be legal uncertainty, as it will be difficult to predict with any 
measure of accuracy what the ratio of apportionment would be. Nevertheless, he 
submits that relative certainty of some measure of responsibility with uncertainty as 
256  Minister of Safety and Security v Madyibi 2010 2 SA 356 (SCA). 
257  Road Accident Fund v Russell 2001 2 SA 34 (SCA). 
258  Discussed above in para 3. 
259  Knobel 2004 THRHR 420-421. 
260  Mafesa v Parity Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1968 2 SA 603 (O). 
261  Knobel 2004 THRHR 420-425. 
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to the exact proportion compared to other parties involved in the matter is still 
preferable. Returning to the Bill, it is perhaps possible that a plaintiff's contributory 
intent may be considered to be of such a nature so as to break the causal link 
between the conduct of the defendant and the plaintiff's harm. 
Botha262 is also in favour of utilising causation when dealing with instances of 
contributory intent. According to him, contributory intent is a term invented by 
academics and is of very little practical value. To a certain extent this is true, since 
this defence has not been expressly recognised as a complete defence in our law, 
but it has nevertheless been recognised by implication, for example in cases where 
the court held that contributory intent cancels negligence on the part of the 
defendant. Even though contributory intent was recognised by the court in Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas 
Bank263 as a defence limiting liability, this approach has been criticised for applying 
outside the constraints of the Apportionment of Damages Act (the "Act"). Botha 
submits that far better and more expeditious solutions of matters in which so-called 
contributory intent features can be reached if they are approached on the basis of 
public policy rather than on the basis of the application of the apportionment 
legislation. He is of the opinion that in light of the problems with contributory fault, 
the emphasis should be on causation. If the courts find it difficult to decide which 
damage was caused by whose conduct, they should ascertain whose conduct made 
the specific damage "more probable" and then let that party bear that damage. 
According to him, fault should not play a role. For example, irrespective of whether 
the defendant's damage-causing conduct was associated with intent or negligence, 
the aggrieved party will receive its full damages. If the plaintiff's damage was caused 
by him- or herself, he or she should not receive any damages. Thus apportionment 
of damage should be based on the criterion of probability of damage being caused. 
In this way apportionment could be applied, irrespective of the presence of intent in 
either party. The court should take into consideration the conduct of both parties 
and assess to what extent the conduct of the defendant made probable the 
262  Botha Verdeling van Skadedragingslas 339.  
263  Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1997 
2 SA 591 (W). 
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causation of the harmful consequences and likewise to what extent the plaintiff's 
conduct made probable the causation of the harmful consequences. Thereafter the 
court should then effect apportionment of the damage-bearing burden according to 
the respective degrees of probability of damage being caused. In a case where it is 
not possible to ascertain even the probabilities, the damage should be divided 
between the parties. In this way the courts would be able to apply the equitable 
principle of apportionment in a wide range of cases. Botha's suggestion is appealing 
but I am of the opinion that fault as well as causation should form part of the 
investigation with regard to apportionment of damages. 
The decision in General Accident Versekeringsmaatskappy SA Bpk v Uijs264 also 
supports the view that not only fault but other factors may be taken into account to 
reduce damages. This approach may be justified in light of the criteria of "justice 
and equity". In order to achieve a really just and equitable result, it is not just the 
degree of the plaintiff's fault that must be considered, but also other relevant 
factors, such as causation. Interestingly enough, here the court took into account 
that the plaintiff did not contribute to (caused) the accident concerned. 
Another approach which is worthy of consideration in our law is that of the Swiss 
system, which makes use of the principle of "abuse of right" and regards it as 
"abusive" to make somebody else responsible for damage caused by the plaintiff 
him- or herself.265 Thus it may be argued that where a plaintiff voluntarily and 
intentionally causes harm to him- or herself, while simultaneously acting consciously 
unreasonable, it would be "abusive" to make the defendant liable where he or she 
merely acted negligently. On the other hand, if we look at the situation where both 
parties intentionally contributed to the plaintiff's loss, it would not be "abusive" to 
apportion damages. 
Perhaps German law provides the fairest solution that could be used in South Africa. 
This system provides for a distribution of damage according to the degree of 
responsibility on the part of the defendant and the plaintiff. The courts focus on the 
264 General Accident Versekeringsmaatskappy SA Bpk v Uijs 1993 4 SA 228 (A) 235; see also 
Neethling and Potgieter 1994 THRHR 131. 
265  See para 4.5 above. 
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degree of causation as well as the different possible degrees of fault of both parties, 
and take into account negligence, intent and presumed fault.266 
6  Conclusion 
In conclusion, there are three aspects to be considered in order to reach an 
equitable result with regard to contributory intent: 
 
(1) The causative contribution of the defendant and the plaintiff to the damage: 
here the courts could take into account which party's conduct was the cause or 
probable cause of the damage (as suggested by Botha). 
(2) The relative degrees of fault of the defendant and the plaintiff: our courts have 
had experience apportioning liability in terms of negligence and have even 
apportioned damages between a defendant and plaintiff both of whom acted 
with intent (as in Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd 
t/a Volkskas Bank). Furthermore, our courts have stated that it is possible to 
apportion liability (of wrongdoers) where they have different forms of intent by 
taking the degrees of their culpability into account. For example, dolus directus 
may be a more culpable form of fault than dolus eventualis and there may 
even be different gradations of culpability inferred from dolus eventualis.267 It 
has also been held268 that liability (of wrongdoers) may be apportioned where 
one wrongdoer acts intentionally and the other negligently, also based on their 
relative degrees of blameworthiness. This approach should also be applied to 
apportionment of damages between a defendant and a plaintiff. Moreover, if 
one accepts, as Neethling does,269 that intent simultaneously constitutes 
negligence, and that an intentional act as a rule amounts to at least a 100% 
deviation from the norm of the reasonable person, apportionment could also 
266  See para 4.4 above. 
267  See the discussion above in para 2.2 in respect of Randbond Investments (Pty) Ltd v FPS 
(Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W) and Lloyd-Gray Lithographers (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor 
Bank t/a Nedbank 1998 2 SA 667 (W). 
268  See Lloyd-Gray Lithographers (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank t/a Nedbank 1998 2 SA 667 (W) 672-673, 
also discussed above para 2.2. 
269  Neethling 1985 THRHR 250. 
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take place on this basis. A party's degree of culpability or blameworthiness, as 
expressed by his percentage-deviation from the norm of the reasonable 
person, should thus play an important part in enabling the court to apportion 
the damages between the defendant and the plaintiff "in a just and equitable" 
manner, having regard to the degree of their "fault in relation to the damage". 
Neethling270 suggests that in instances where, for example, one party acted 
negligently and the other with intention, the ratio could be 60:100. In instances 
where one party acts with dolus eventualis and the other with dolus directus 
the ratio of apportionment could be 100:120.  
(3) In the final analysis, courts should have the discretion to take into account any 
other relevant factor (such as the abuse of right in Swiss law) which can assist 
them at arriving at a just and equitable apportionment of damages, as was 
suggested in General Accident Versekeringsmaatskappy SA Bpk v Uijs. The 
same approach is supported by the Bill,271 where it states that "[w]hen 
apportioning loss the court must attribute responsibility for the loss suffered in 
proportions that are just and equitable". 
The Bill if enacted could provide for an equitable result in cases of contributory 
intent as, in effect, it allows for apportionment of loss based on the considerations 
mentioned in (1), (2) and (3) above. Although, as stated before by Knobel,272 this 
may result in uncertainty as to the exact ratio of apportionment, our courts would at 
least have many factors to take into account to provide a fair and equitable result - 
there is no Act without any challenges arising from it in practical situations. In the 
meantime, while the courts have only the common law and the Apportionment of 
Damages Act at their disposal the defence of contributory intent should apply as a 
ground excluding fault in instances where voluntary assumption of risk in the form of 
consent is invalid.273 Within the ambit of the Apportionment of Damages Act, in 
instances where the plaintiff's fault is in the form of contributory intent and the 
defendant's in the form of negligence or vice versa, or where both parties acted with 
270  Neethling 1998 THRHR 521. 
271  See s 3(1) of the Apportionment of Loss Bill 2003. 
272  Knobel 2004 THRHR 420-425. 
273  See Ahmed 2012 Obiter 414ff; Ahmed 2014 SALJ 88ff.  
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intent, there seems to be sufficient scope for the courts to apportion damages in a 
fair and just manner, taking into account any relevant factor. The foundation for this 
approach is evident from General Accident Versekeringsmaatskappy SA Bpk v Uijs. 
This approach does not rule out that a court may decide not to reduce the 
defendant's damages because of the plaintiff's contributory intent, since such a 
result would be fair and equitable; and vice versa where the defendant acted 
intentionally while the plaintiff was only negligent, that the plaintiff receives his full 
damages. In conclusion, there are indeed sufficient practical and theoretical grounds 
which validate the need for the recognition and development of the defence of 
contributory intent applying either as a ground limiting or excluding liability in terms 
of common law or within the ambit of apportionment legislation. 
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